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About the Study: The Rule of Law and Mexico’s Energy Reform/Estado 
de Derecho y Reforma Energética en México 
The 2013 changes to the constitutional framework and the summer 2014 enabling 
legislation in Mexico’s energy industry represent a thorough break with the prevailing 
national narrative as well as the political and legal traditions of twentieth century Mexico. 
Mexico is about to embark on an unprecedented opening of its energy sector in the midst 
of important unknown factors, as well as a fiercely competitive and expanding 
international energy market. Mexico is one of the last developing countries to open its 
energy sector to foreign investment, and although there are important lessons that can be 
learned from other countries’ experiences, this does not imply that the opening will be 
necessarily as successful as the government promises or that the implementation of the 
new laws will go smoothly. Almost certainly, after the enabling legislation goes into effect, 
important questions of law will emerge during the implementation, and unavoidably, 
refinements to the legislation will have to take place.  
The book “Estado de Derecho y Reforma Energética en México,” published in México by 
Tirant lo Blanch and written in Spanish, is the culmination of a major research effort to 
examine rule of law issues arising under the energy reform in Mexico by drawing on 
scholars and experts from American and Mexican institutions in order to bring attention to 
the different component parts of the new Mexican energy sector from a legal standpoint. 
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The development of the petroleum sector has been characterized by a succession of cycles 
of investment and expropriation (i.e., forced renegotiation of contracts, nationalization, 
changes in fiscal rules, etc.). These cycles have been particularly pronounced in Latin 
America, although other regions and even developed countries have also experienced this 
phenomenon. This essay intends to provide elements for understanding why these cycles 
occur in light of the regional experience and to derive lessons to be considered during the 
implementation of the petroleum reform in Mexico.   
 
The fiscal and contractual framework for the exploitation of petroleum resources in Latin 
America has undergone important changes over the course of the past decades. During the 
1990s, the hydrocarbons sector of the region was opened up to private investment and the 
fiscal and contractual frameworks were made more flexible to attract foreign investment; 
during the first decade of the 21st century, the significant increase in the price of oil 
generated great political and social pressures to increase the government-take and exercise 
more state control. This trend materialized strongly in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Venezuela, and, more recently and with less intensity, Brazil, although in one way 
or another, it had an impact in all productive countries. Expropriation, forced 
renegotiation of contracts, and other regulatory changes that negatively affected foreign 
investors had significant effects in terms of reputation, which contributed to the fact that 
the region did not take advantage of high oil prices in order to increase investment and 
production, with the significant exceptions of Brazil and Colombia. Considered as a whole, 
Latin America produced slightly less in 2013 than when the price boom started in 2003.1 
Latin America lost one percentage point of the worldwide market share and now has the 
lowest rate of extraction among regions in the world.2  
 
The specific characteristics of the sector—among them the presence of significant revenue, 
a high proportion of sunken costs, and changes in the risk profile of projects—contribute to 
making it particularly vulnerable to expropriation cycles. Petroleum nationalism, and its 
absence, have not only been motivated by the ideological preferences of the governments 
of the region, but rather to a great degree have been the result of the incentives generated 
by geological characteristics, investment and price cycles, and other structural and 
institutional variables.  
 
The same country has had different policies depending on the type of resource, and even 
the policies of a given administration have been different whenever circumstances have 
changed. One of the basic variables has been the amount of revenue present at a given 
time; therefore, the international price of oil is a key element. Significant price increases 
tend to generate significant incentives for the renegotiation of contracts and fiscal 
conditions as well as for expropriation or nationalization. The end of a significant 
investment cycle, when significant projects that incorporate production and reserves are 
completed, also generates incentives for changing the rules. 
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Another relevant variable is the progressiveness of the fiscal and contractual framework; 
that is, to what extent the government-take automatically rises in response to an increase in 
revenue, particularly one generated through price increases. Fiscal and contractual 
frameworks that are barely progressive or are even regressive, such as those that have 
characterized the region, have caused states to have powerful incentives to raise the tax 
burden or to expropriate during periods of significant price increases. In general, the fiscal 
frameworks of petroleum resources have been unsophisticated and have not incorporated 
significant contingencies in terms of price and profitability. The lack of adaptability and 
progressiveness of the fiscal and contractual frameworks has contributed to creating cycles 
of tax structures that are more flexible or stringent.3 
 
The lack of institutional capacity and credibility of certain countries makes their fiscal and 
contractual frameworks unreliable for investors. This may cause those countries to adopt 
rigid rules or instruments that are not suitable for changes in profitability; use international 
mechanisms of commitment, such as arbitration or investment treaties, thereby losing 
sovereignty and flexibility; or offer very high yields at the start of the projects to 
compensate for high regulatory risks. It could also result in in less investment in the sector 
than what it could have been obtained with a more solid institutional framework. If lack of 
credibility is the reason for offering very attractive conditions in order to attract investors, 
such conditions would tend to be more prone to renegotiation. This problem of “time 
inconsistency” is one of the reasons why the stability of the tax and contractual framework 
is precarious and leads to the cycles of investment and expropriation that have 
characterized petroleum resources in the region and a great part of the world. 
 
The Mexican petroleum reform has the advantage of being able to apply lessons learned 
from the experience accumulated over the past two decades in the region. Among these 
lessons, the following are noteworthy: 1) there are significant risks of reversing reforms; 2) 
the failure of reforms to attract investment and increase production can be a reason for 
their reversal, but significant success in terms of reserves and production can also exert 
pressure to renege on contracts; 3) significant changes in the international price of oil can 
generate incentives for renegotiation as long as contracts do not properly cover such 
contingencies, and sometimes even when they do; and 4) the credibility of the regulatory 
framework is an essential condition for maximizing the benefits of the petroleum sector, 
since regulatory insecurity leads to either less investment or a smaller share of profits for 
the state.   
 
The Political Economy of the Petroleum Industry 
 
An analysis of the political economy of the petroleum industry must take into account the 
interaction between the following factors: 1) the very characteristics of the sector that 
distinguish it from other industries; 2) the available resources of the country, such as 
geological potential, available reserves, and the status of the country as a net importer or 
exporter; 3) the characteristics of the institutional and contractual framework, including the 
fiscal system; and 4) economic factors—first and foremost, price cycles, and also the stage 
of the investment cycle in the country and the risk level of projects, technological change, 
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and the government’s dependence on petroleum revenue. An analysis of these factors is 
necessary in order to assess the impact of the fiscal and contractual framework on the 
performance of the sector.  
 
Characteristics of the Petroleum Sector 
 
The hydrocarbons sector has the following characteristics: 1) very significant economic 
rents are generated through the extraction of oil and to a lesser degree through the 
extraction of natural gas; 2) a high proportion of sunken costs (immobilized investments) is 
required in comparison with operating and non-sunken costs; 3) most of the reserves and 
investment opportunities are located in countries that are institutionally weak and subject 
to high political risks; 4) there is significant variation in terms of risk during the different 
stages of investment in the sector: while oil exploration involves high geological risk, these 
risks decrease considerably during the development and extraction stages; 5) the products, 
gas or oil derivatives such as gasoline, are consumed widely by the population and 
represent a significant portion of their basket of consumer goods; 6) the price of oil (and 
that of gas, to some degree) on the international market is volatile, and therefore, revenue 
obtained from oil is also volatile; and 7) the revenue generated is relatively easy for 
governments to appropriate (Monaldi 2010; Manzano and Monaldi 2008). These traits 
have very important implications for the development of the fiscal framework of the 
sector as well as for conflicts between governments, companies, and consumers.  
 
Unlike other industries, petroleum exploitation and, to a lesser degree, gas exploitation 
creates significant rents. These revenues are generally defined as the profit exceeding the 
opportunity cost of reproducible production factors (labor and capital).4 For example, in 
the case of Latin America, the cost of oil extraction of typically varies between USD 4 and 
USD 15 per barrel. Based on these costs, the boom in prices to levels above USD 100 per 
barrel during the past decade generated exorbitant rents. However, when, the oil price 
dropped below USD 10 in 1998, rents were much lower, and some deposits were producing 
without generating any rents or even operating at a loss.  
 
In theory, rents can be easily collected by the government without affecting long-term 
production. For this purpose, governments can use tools inherently related to their 
sovereign control over taxes and regulations as well as their property rights over the 
subsoil. As long as a producer covers its costs and obtains a return that sufficiently 
compensates for the risk, the collection of rents by the state should not provide any 
obstacle to the development of the potential of the sector. On some occasions, however, oil 
companies withhold a significant part of these rents, whereas in others, states over-extract 
resources and/or expropriate investors by not permitting them to recover the investment 
at an attractive rate of return. In the first scenario, the state and its citizens lose financial 
income that may be significant without any economic justification. In the second scenario, 
incentives for long-term investment are harmed, and the development of the potential of 
the sector is affected. 
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This inability to efficiently capture the rents generated through the exploitation of 
hydrocarbons is partly due to rigid contractual arrangements and the lack of 
progressiveness of the fiscal systems, under which the government obtains an increase in 
the collection of taxes that is less than proportional to the increase in international price. 
This means that, in view of significant increases in the international oil price, governments 
have incentives to renege on their commitments assumed during periods with lower price 
levels. On the other hand, during periods of low prices, the institutional and fiscal 
frameworks generally make investment hardly attractive. 
 
The petroleum and gas industry is also characterized by the presence of high sunken costs, 
assets that due to their very nature are immobilized before companies start recovering 
their investment.5 As soon as these assets are tied up, their ex post value for alternative uses 
is very low, which opens the door for appropriation by the government. The state can 
forcibly increase its share of revenue and companies would continue to have incentives to 
continue operating to the extent that they recover operating costs (which are 
proportionally less).6 As soon as most of the immobilized investment has been made, 
governments will have incentives to expropriate by changing the terms of investment, 
whether by tax increases, regulatory changes, or by unilaterally fixing prices on the 
domestic market to levels below opportunity cost—for example, the price of gasoline or 
gas.7 The political benefits of reneging on commitments are high. Over the short term, the 
government can extract abundant fiscal resources or transfer them to consumers via 
artificially low prices without causing any significant impact on production. This logic 
applies even in the case of state-owned companies.8 
 
The exploration and production of oil is particularly risky from a political and regulatory 
point of view because most of the reserves throughout the world are concentrated in 
developing countries with weak institutions and are subject to high political risks. The 
governments of these countries have difficulties convincing investors of their capacity to 
commit to and comply with signed agreements in a manner in which private investors, as 
well as state companies, can recover their sunken costs. If the political benefits that can be 
obtained from reneging on agreements are high and the short-term costs of doing so are 
low, then only the presence of strong domestic institutions or external mechanisms capable 
of enforcing compliance can ensure the credibility of property rights (Manzano and 
Monaldi 2008).9 
 
The geological and economic risk varies significantly among petroleum projects. 
Depending on the level of these risks and the magnitude of investment in the projects, 
governments will be either more or less willing to invite multinational companies and offer 
attractive conditions for investment (Nolan and Thurber 2010). The existence of high 
geological risks during oil exploration provides incentives for governments to offer 
attractive conditions for investors at this stage. However, once exploration is successful, 
governments start to have incentives for renegotiating the initial conditions.10 
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State-owned companies tend to favor stages and projects with less risk, such as in areas that 
have already been developed and are mature. The basic reason for this is that state 
companies have less capacity to handle large high-risk projects; unlike multinational 
companies, they tend to have their reserves concentrated in a single geographic area and 
are therefore less diversified. Likewise, a state as a shareholder tends to be more averse to 
assuming very high risks and does not offer incentives for the state manager to assume 
such risks (Nolan and Thurber 2010).  
 
In turn, for projects on the technological frontier or in areas with a higher geological risk, 
large-scale multinational companies tend to be better positioned in the exploration of new 
oil provinces, in areas with difficult access (deep-water), or in the performance of non-
conventional crude oil projects (bitumen or shale).11   
 
The volatility of international oil prices means high revenue volatility. The fiscal systems 
of the countries in the region have had difficulty in collecting all the rents that are 
generated under different price scenarios, and price volatility is therefore particularly 
problematic. In the case of countries that depend on petroleum and gas exports such as 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, price volatility can cause great macroeconomic and fiscal 
instability, except where effective stabilization mechanisms have been implemented—
which has hardly been common in these countries. Therefore, even though expropriation 
is more prevalent and generalized during periods of high prices, the governments of 
hydrocarbon-exporting countries may be tempted to renege on their contractual terms 
and, in particular, squeeze state companies in the event that prices drop and the 
government faces a fiscal crisis.  
 
Availability of Resources, Exportable Excess Volumes, and Fiscal 
Dependency 
 
The incentives of governments are influenced in a specific manner by the availability of 
the country’s energy resources and its status as a net exporter or importer. Countries with 
scarce proven reserves in proportion to their internal market and that need to increase 
investment and production in the sector, such as Colombia and Peru, will act very 
differently from countries with abundant resources and large installed investments, such as 
Mexico or Venezuela. Therefore, when analyzing the political oil economy, the distinction 
between countries with excess volumes and countries with shortages must be emphasized.12 
 
Countries that are significant net exporters in relation to their population and the size of 
their economy and that have abundant or growing reserves tend to prioritize maximizing 
rents as a goal of their policies. Depending on the political-institutional framework, this 
maximization of rents will be carried out either based on a long-term perspective or with 
an emphasis on present rents. Maximization of production ceases to be a priority in these 
cases. In turn, countries that are net importers or on the road to becoming net importers 
and that have scarce and/or declining proven reserves will tend to have different policy 
goals: they will prioritize the maximization of production in order to become self-
sufficient or to avoid becoming net importers in the future.13  
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It is possible to note certain regular traits in terms of how the oil and gas activity is 
organized depending on whether the countries in question are net importers or exporters 
of oil. The governments of net exporting countries will be more reluctant to privatize 
petroleum companies, considering that by maintaining them as state companies, they can 
be used as “petty cash” for the governments, which would be more difficult if they were 
private. Additionally, in countries that are net exporters, due to the fact that oil state 
companies tend to have fewer financial deficits than their counterparts in net importing 
countries or compared to other state companies in sectors lacking rents, the classical 
arguments in favor of privatization are less evident.14  
 
Whenever oil prices rise significantly, the trend toward resource nationalization and 
increasing taxes is common in net exporters. In those cases where governments are willing 
to offer foreign investors access to their petroleum reserves, net exporters with substantial 
reserves have a lot of power during negotiations with international companies, considering 
that the latter have very few alternatives of this kind since most of the proven oil reserves 
worldwide are in the hands of state companies.  
 
The Fiscal and Contractual Framework of the Petroleum Sector 
 
To fully understand the nature and implications of the fiscal and contractual framework of 
the petroleum sector, it is necessary to incorporate taxes as well as contributions, 
participations, and regulations set forth contractually for the operation of the reservoir. 
Both from the state’s point of view as well as the point of view of the operator, the most 
relevant elements is the amount, the time, and the manner according to which the 
operator, whether state-owned or private, will transfer resources proceeding from the 
revenue of the operation to the state. It is also crucial to understand at what price this flow 
of revenue will be generated, and whether the state has power to regulate it or if it will be 
an international market price. In other words, how are the property rights resulting from 
the flows of revenue from the extraction of the resource assigned? This makes it necessary 
to analyze the entire set of fiscal and contracting rules.  
 
In almost all countries in the world, with the important exception of the United States, the 
state owns the subsoil and its resources. However, in some countries, the state grants 
concessions that give the operator property rights over the resource for a specific period of 
time. This is known as a concession. The operator pays royalties and taxes in accordance 
with the exploitation activities that are carried out. In the case of other types of contracts, 
the state retains ownership of the resource, and operators are entitled to receive a portion 
of the profits obtained through their exploitation, although they do not own the oil and gas 
in the subsoil. The portion that is obtained by the operators depends on the contractual 
terms and conditions.15  
 
The fiscal rules of hydrocarbon exploitation are established through a variety of taxes and, 
in some cases, contractual shares of the state. The most common means include bonuses, 
royalties, and taxes on profits. Finally, there are other special taxes such as export taxes, 
windfall profit taxes, and resource taxes.16 
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The royalty or tax rate may vary in accordance with a scale based on production or 
profitability. In a similar manner, the production/profit-sharing agreements or risk service 
contracts tend to have a progressive scale according to which the state share grows as 
profitability of the project increases. The tax on windfall profits is a variation of this type of 
mechanism that is applied when prices or profitability reach significant levels.  
 
There are a variety of desirable criteria that can be used to evaluate the fiscal and 
contractual framework, some of which cannot be achieved simultaneously; therefore, there 
are trade-offs among these objectives.17 Generally speaking, the value of the nation’s 
resources must be maximized, stimulating the development of the sector’s potential. To do 
so, it is necessary to establish conditions directed at ensuring the profitability of the 
projects for their investors. On the other hand, the economic rents must be captured.  
 
The most relevant criterion in terms of the relationship between state and investor is 
progressivity, which means that the government-take goes up as profitability of the project 
increases. Royalties and especially bonuses are regressive: the higher the profit, the lower 
the government-take over profits. Taxes on profits are less regressive, although they are 
generally also not efficient at collecting revenue. The mechanisms that are progressive are 
those whose rates vary based on a profitability indicator, such as production-sharing 
agreements with variable rates and windfall profit taxes. These mechanisms are more 
sophisticated, more susceptible to evasion, and require major monitoring by the state. In 
the event that a fiscal framework is not progressive, the state will have very powerful 
incentives to change it as rents increase—for example, due to an increase in the price or the 
discovery of a very productive deposit. 
 
The instability of the fiscal and contractual frameworks could be reduced if they were less 
rigid and more progressive. Why is it then that, in general, developing countries do not 
have more progressive fiscal rules?, The explanation focuses mostly on variables of political 
economy that ensure that governments prefer fiscal systems that are easy to implement, 
that do not require much monitoring of the sector, that guarantee a state share under any 
economic circumstance, and that reduce the fiscal income volatility of petroleum revenues. 
The states fear that existing asymmetries of information between the collecting entity and 
the companies are used by the latter to evade payment of taxes.18 Also, governments 
generally have short-term horizons and therefore prefer greater present payments than a 
larger total government-take over the long term. Finally, many governments, being 
dependent on the income from revenues of this type, tend to implement fiscal systems that 
generate more stable flows of tax revenue, even when they are less efficient. 
 
The Latin American Experience: Cycles of Investment and Expropriation 
 
This section analyzes case studies from Latin America to evaluate the factors that induce 
expropriation cycles. The countries of this region have used a variety of contractual and tax 
systems to regulate petroleum activities and collect the revenues that are generated 
thereby. Within such diversity, the majority of the systems have been regressive or slightly 
progressive. Monaldi and Manzano (2008) and Sinott et al. (2010), among others, show that 
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the government-take did not initially increase as a result of the increase in prices during 
the past decade; as a matter of fact, in some countries, it decreased. This contributed to the 
renegotiation of contracts, tax changes, and the creation of windfall profit taxes. Argentina, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and, more recently, Brazil increased the government-take. In 
the case of Brazil, this increase did not apply to already-signed contracts. In the other cases, 
it was applied retroactively, which meant the cancellation, forced renegotiation, or 
expropriation of preexisting contracts.19  
 
For example, in Venezuela, the royalty rate was increased from one percent to 33 percent 
for contracts covering the extra-heavy Orinoco Oil Belt, and the corporate income tax rate 
was raised from 34 percent to 50 percent. Additionally, a new windfall profits tax was 
implemented. In Bolivia, royalties on gas were increased substantially, and in Argentina, a 
new export tax was applied at a rate of 30 percent. In Ecuador, forced renegotiation 
transformed all projects into low-profitability service agreements, although an aggressive 
windfall profits tax had been previously implemented (which collected 99 percent of the 
profit at high oil prices). In Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, several projects 
were partially or entirely nationalized. In Brazil, after the successful pre-salt discoveries, 
the government decided to increase the state’s share via taxes, shareholding, control of 




Venezuela is perhaps the most relevant case for Mexico because it is the other large 
exporter in the region and also has a long tradition as a producer.20 The case of Venezuela 
illustrates the dynamics I have commented on in terms of how expropriation cycles follow 
successful cycles of investment, and how cycles of high prices provide incentives for 
expropriation. Venezuela has behaved as would be expected of a typical net exporter with 
high discount rates, with the clear goal of maximizing short-term revenue and subsidizing 
the domestic market for oil products such as gasoline. Likewise, the case of Venezuela also 
demonstrates the conflicts that are created between governments, companies, and other 
players when very inflexible fiscal systems do not allow governments to collect rents 
resulting from price increases. 
 
Throughout the history of the Venezuelan oil industry, there have been two investment 
cycles followed by very different expropriation cycles. During the first cycle, after decades 
of investment by mainly international companies, the taxes imposed on these companies 
increased significantly in the 1960s and 1970s, and petroleum concessions were not 
renewed. As a result, oil investment declined from 1958 until 1976. On the other hand, 
production continued to increase until the early 1970s when it abruptly dropped, although 
this occurred much later than the drop the investment—as tends to happen in industries 
that have high sunken costs—reducing the apparent political costs of decisions that 
adversely affect the industry. Afterward, in 1976, the petroleum industry was nationalized. 
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), the recently established national oil company, 
increased investment significantly, propped up by high oil prices. PDVSA was designed 
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with a system of governance that minimized political interference and excessive extraction 
of revenues by the government, guaranteeing its financial and operational autonomy. 
 
The second cycle of investment started at the beginning of the 1990s within a context that 
required enormous new investments to increase production. Under these circumstances, 
PDVSA significantly increased capital expenditures in order to handle such investments. At 
the same time, the fiscal difficulties experienced by the Venezuelan government led to the 
opening of the petroleum sector to private operators, initially in areas with little 
profitability and with significant technological and operational challenges that required 
high investments, which PDVSA did not want to make alone. The government opened the 
sector to private investment using a special contractual framework that provided important 
guarantees against the reneging of commitments assumed by the government, using 
PDVSA and its assets abroad as a guaranty. As a result of these contracts, private investment 
increased substantially toward the end of the 1990s and privately operated production rose 
to 1.1 million barrels per day by 2005, accounting for more than a third of total production 
(Manzano and Monaldi 2010).  
 
When President Chávez, an extremely harsh critic of opening the industry to private 
capital, came to power in 1999, the government began to extract more resources from 
PDVSA. However, until 2005, the executive branch did not adopt any measures to change 
contracts and tax conditions or to nationalize the capital of companies. Why did it take the 
government almost six years after coming to power to once again nationalize the industry? 
The explanation seems to lie in the guarantees and conditions established in the contracts 
that made it difficult to breach them without significant costs for the nation, the difficulty 
of getting rid of the institutional autonomy of PDVSA, and the fact that significant 
investments by private parties were still planned for the period 1999-2004 (Manzano and 
Monaldi 2010). 
 
Between 2002 and 2003, the initiatives of the government to eliminate the autonomy of 
PDVSA resulted in a massive strike, which dramatically decreased public investment and 
production. The government laid off half the workforce and the majority of managers, 
taking over complete political control of the company. By 2004, the cycle of private 
investment had been completed, and high international prices were ensuring solid profits 
over the short run for the government in the event that it reneged on its commitments 
stipulated under the oil contracts. During the following two years, the petroleum 
contractual framework changed significantly, and both the government-take on profits and 
control over private investment increased significantly. In 2007, the government 
“nationalized” the petroleum industry and took majority control over all projects operated 
by private parties without offering any market compensation. The weakening of domestic 
institutions resulted in a new expropriation cycle (Monaldi 2010). 
 
Since 2009—although much more pronounced since 2012—the decline in production in 
Venezuela and, more recently, the drop in prices have once again caused the Venezuelan 
government to want to attract investors to initiate a new investment cycle in the Orinoco 
Oil Belt and for offshore extraction of natural gas. Once again, history repeats itself: the 
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question is whether, in spite of the regulatory and political risks, these investments will be 
achieved. Multinational companies such as Chevron, ENI, and Repsol as well as Chinese 
and Russian state-owned companies have signed contracts to develop new projects. The 
trend is very clear: the Venezuelan government has been offering important concessions to 
international companies, among them better fiscal conditions, more operational control, 
international arbitration of loan agreements, and a more competitive exchange rate. It still 
remains to be seen whether this new “opening” is successful in attracting sufficient 




The case of Ecuador also offers interesting perspectives on the case of Mexico.22 
Historically, Petroecuador/Petroamazonas—like PEMEX, at least until the reform—has had 
limited financial and operational autonomy. The government, rather than the company, 
collected the revenue from petroleum, transferring to the National Oil Company (NOC) 
limited resources intended for investment. Therefore, the company experienced persistent 
difficulties in terms of complying with its expansion plans. Due to the financial difficulties 
of the state-owned company and the drop in the price of oil, attractive conditions were 
offered to private parties in the 1990s. In 1993, production-sharing agreements were 
signed, and in 1999, mixed companies were established. The reforms in the 1990s 
successfully attracted investment, and the private sector became the country’s main 
producer, overtaking the state. At the start of the 1990s, annual foreign investment in 
petroleum was less than USD 200 million; in 2000, the number exceeded USD one billion 
(Monaldi 2010). 
 
President Rafael Correa was elected in 2006 on a nationalistic platform, and he enacted a 
significant increase in government control of petroleum activities and in the government-
take. Initially, he increased the tax on profits applicable to petroleum companies from 30 
percent to 50 percent; then, he established a windfall profits tax of 99 percent, and the 
contract with Occidental Petroleum was canceled. Likewise, the government accused 
several companies of tax evasion and demanded reparations. Finally, the government 
forced all companies to transform their profit sharing agreements and mixed companies 
into pure service contracts with limited attractiveness for operators. Several companies, 
among them Petrobras, abandoned the country (Musacchio et al. 2009).  
 
Similar to the case of Venezuela, Ecuador’s success in attracting private investment in the 
1990s together with the increase in oil prices generated powerful incentives and 
opportunities for the government to default on commitments. Likewise, as has also been 
the case in Mexico and Venezuela, the governance structure of the state-owned petroleum 
company has favored excessive profit expropriation by the government and has facilitated 
the stagnation of investment in the sector.  
 
Recently, Ecuador signed large contracts with service companies such as Schlumberger to 
manage mature oil fields in terms that are very attractive to the contractor. Once again, the 
NOC is short of cash and pragmatism has led to a larger role for the private sector. Chinese 
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state-owned companies have also become key partners of the Ecuadorian state not only as 
operators but also as lenders to the country, getting repaid with exported crude oil. 
However, service agreements make attracting investment in high-risk projects difficult, as a 
result of which an increase in the flexibility of the institutional framework over the next 




Bolivia represents another typical case of a country that has been highly successful in 
attracting investment and increasing gas production and reserves with a tax system 
designed during a period of low international hydrocarbon prices that was not sufficiently 
progressive over the short term.23 As a result, as soon as international prices increased and 
most of the investments had already been immobilized, strong incentives were generated 
to renegotiate contracts and nationalize the industry.  
 
Over the period from 1996 to 1997, the government put into practice an innovative process 
to privatize the state-owned pretroleum company, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales 
Bolivianos (YPFB). During this process, Bolivia capitalized the country’s pension funds with 
shares of YPFB and privatized the remainder. By making its fiscal and contractual 
framework attractive, it collected significant private investments in gas exploration and 
production. As a result, Bolivia managed to successfully increase foreign investment, 
production, exports, and natural gas reserves. Direct foreign investment in the 
hydrocarbons sector reached USD 2.5 billion over the period 1993-2002, representing 40 
percent of all foreign investment in the country. Proven reserves of natural gas increased 
sevenfold, and net exports quadrupled. 
 
The Bolivian tax system had characteristics that made it progressive in the long run but not 
over the short term. As explained before, this creates tension and distribution conflicts 
between governments and companies as soon as prices increase.24 The increase in the 
international price of hydrocarbons and the fact that significant investment in the sector 
had already been completed created powerful incentives so that first, the government 
renegotiated the price of gas under export contracts and the state share of gas profits, and 
second, it proceeded with the nationalization of the industry.25 These measures were 
overwhelmingly supported by the population in a referendum.26 Royalties were raised 
from 18 percent to 50 percent, and the government obtained shareholding control over all 
hydrocarbon projects (Monaldi 2010; Musacchio et al. 2009). Similar to the cases of 
Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela, foreign investors were victims of their own success in 




Argentina went from being a relevant exporter of oil in the 1990s—even surpassing 
Colombia—to recently becoming a net importer with decreasing production over the past 
decade. Like Bolivia and Venezuela, Argentina was very successful in the 1990s in opening 
the sector to private capital and privatizating the formerly state-owned company, 
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Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF). However, with the macroeconomic crisis of 2001-
2002, the country defaulted on all its contracts, created an export tax, and forced 
companies to subsidize the domestic market. Profitability of the sector was severely 
affected, which led to a significant drop in investment, production, and proven reserves. 
However, there were substantial discoveries of non-conventional resources in the area of 
Vaca Muerta that promise to make the country an energy powerhouse once again.27 
However, investment did not increase and hydrocarbon imports grew, generating a crisis 
in terms of the balance of payments. This caused the government to renationalize YPF in 
2012, although in light of the need for a new investment cycle, the government 
immediately opened a new opportunity for private capital and changed the hydrocarbons 
law to make the conditions more attractive for investment. Chevron has become a key 
partner of YPF in Vaca Muerta.28 Once again, the incentives provide a significant 




In spite of its recent difficulties, there is no doubt that Brazil has been one of the most 
successful cases in the region over the past two decades. The institutional framework 
projected credibility to investors and, for a long time, it seemed to have protected the state-
owned petroleum company from being “expropriated.” Brazil was the third-largest 
producer in the region, and it overtook Mexico in 2015 and Venezuela in 2016. However, 
until a few years ago, Brazil was a significant net importer. Brazil reduced its dependency 
on imports through a combination of long-term policies permitting production increases 
and replacing domestic oil consumption with ethanol and natural gas.  
 
The petroleum sector was opened up to private investment from 1995 to 1997, eliminating 
the constitution-mandated monopoly of Petrobras, the state-owned petroleum company. 
To provide more credibility to the regulatory framework, the government created an 
independent regulatory agency to supervise the petroleum sector. Furthermore, Petrobras 
was partly privatized. Even though the state maintains control over the majority of shares 
with voting rights, a significant portion of the company’s capital is in private hands. As a 
result of the reforms, investment in Petrobras surpassed USD 46 billion over the period 
1992-2002 and has continued to rise over the last decade. Since then, Brazil has carried out 
multiple bidding rounds for petroleum areas with private investors. As a result of these 
policies, great success was achieved in exploration and production. 
 
The discoveries of massive offshore oil reserves in the Pre-salt province promised to make 
Brazil a relevant net exporter in the future, substantially changing the incentives of the 
government and its citizens. Even at a time when production of the pre-salt deposits was 
still incipient, with the expectation of abundance the country appeared to have assumed 
the attitude of a net exporter, focusing on rent collection and distribution. This caused 
some changes within the institutional framework. Among them, the following are 
noteworthy: 1) the requirement that all new offshore projects be operated by Petrobras and 
that the state-owned company must have a minimum equity participation of 30 percent in 
the capital; 2) the increase of the state’s equity share in Petrobras in exchange for access to 
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the pre-salt reserves, subject to terms which were considered by the “market” as an 
“expropriation” of the minority shareholders, with a resulting drop in share value; and 3) 
the increase in the national content requirements to very significant levels that greatly 
increased extraction costs. At the same time, a dispute broke out between regions and 
different interest groups regarding the allocation of future petroleum revenue, and the 
government forced the state-owned company to subsidize the domestic market. More 
recently, a large corruption scandal regarding the contracting practices of Petrobras has 
cast doubt on the exceptional character of the Brazilian petroleum industry, which had 
been the regional model. The company has not been able to attain its goals of production 
over the past few years, and with the drop in oil prices, significant restructuring has 
become necessary. 
 
It is important to emphasize that unlike other countries in the region that changed their 
contracts, Brazil did not retroactively do so; changes in the law only applied to new 
contracts, while earlier ones continue to be governed by the conditions originally agreed 
upon. Therefore, although the changes that occurred within Petrobras were detrimental to 
minority shareholders, the case of Brazil differs from the aforementioned ones in nature. 
The impression is given that the new government in 2016 understands the need to make 
changes and recover the lost credibility of the state and the development model of the 
sector, which will motivate it to implement policies that are more favorable for investment, 




Today, Colombia is a net exporter—the third-largest in the region, having surpassed 
Ecuador—although it still has a precarious endowment of proven reserves. The case of 
Colombia has significant similarities to the Mexican opening of the sector. In the decade of 
the 1990s, as a result of the discovery of significant highly productive deposits, oil became 
an important generator of foreign currency and tax income, accounting for more than 25 
percent. However, starting in 1999, Colombia’s production and reserves began to collapse, 
and by 2004, it appeared inevitable that Colombia would become a net importer of oil 
during the following decade. 
 
The Colombian case illustrates the potential hazards when a country assumes a revenue 
mentality after the discovery of reserves and a period of high investment, although it also 
shows how a state is capable of righting its course and adjusting policies in an effective 
manner. In the 1990s, the boom in petroleum production generated perverse 
macroeconomic effects and created fiscal difficulties and problems for competitiveness. 
Additionally, the contractual conditions were hardly attractive for investment in 
exploration, which was also harmed by the state of insecurity caused by guerrilla activity 
(Echeverry et al. 2009). 
 
Unlike in the cases of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, the price boom during the past 
decade found Colombia with dropping reserves and production in free fall, which did not 
generate incentives for expropriation. Quite to the contrary, Colombia required starting a 
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new cycle of investments. In view of the industry’s decline, the Colombian state adopted a 
series of fiscal and contractual reforms in 2005 to make investment more attractive and 
improve the competitiveness of the state-owned company, Ecopetrol. Following the 
Brazilian model, which was also inspired by the Norwegian model, 10 percent of 
Ecopetrol’s shares were very successfully placed on the stock market, which gave the 
company greater financial and operational autonomy; likewise, an independent regulatory 
agency was created. The credibility and attractiveness of investment generated by these 
institutional reforms initiated a quick reversal of the production decline. Between 2007 and 
2010, production increased by more than 150 thousand barrels per day.29  
 
There were still some societal pressures to increase state control after the recent increase in 
production. These pressures have been contained, in part because the country has not 
managed to incorporate significant new reserves—despite a significant increase in 
exploration—and partly because its production has relatively high costs and risks. As a 
matter of fact, in light of the drop in prices since 2014, Colombia has announced that it will 
make the conditions of investment even more attractive. 
 
Implications for the Case of Mexico’s Petroleum Reform 
 
This section will discuss the implications of the regional analysis for the case of Mexico’s 
energy reform. The following are some general lessons that are suggested by the analysis in 
the preceding sections:  
1. Attempts must be made to establish progressive fiscal and contractual rules that 
maintain competitiveness, allowing the state to collect revenues at different levels of 
price and profitability. As much as possible, these rules must be simple and 
transparent, and they must guarantee a minimum level of the state’s share of profits.  
2. From a political point of view, it is not sufficient that the fiscal and contractual 
frameworks are progressive throughout the life of the project, but rather that the 
government-take should increase automatically in the case of significant price 
increases. Otherwise, the fiscal framework will tend to become unstable with price 
volatility. It is important to take these types of political considerations—not only 
economic ones—into account in the design of fiscal mechanisms.  
3. Having an institutional and contractual framework with little credibility creates 
significant costs in terms of investments foregone or a smaller state share of profits. 
With greater regulatory risk, it will be necessary to offer greater returns 
concentrated at the start of the project. Paradoxically, therefore, the more the state 
limits its opportunistic discretion in the future, the more it will be able to obtain 
better ex ante conditions. Therefore, issues such as the conditions and processes for 
contract cancellation must be very clearly defined so as to not generate unnecessary 
uncertainty. On the other hand, mechanisms such as international arbitration and 
bilateral investment treaties can serve to obtain credibility, even at a cost of 
discretion and flexibility. 
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4. The risks of the reversal of opening an industry to private capital are relevant, 
judging by the history of the sector in the region and in other developing countries. 
The failure to attract sufficient investment may be one cause for reversal, although 
it is more likely that great success in terms of increasing reserves and production 
may create incentives for the renegotiation of contracts. A sudden increase in the 
international price of oil might also create strong incentives for renegotiation. 
Finally, if political sectors opposed to the energy reform are elected to the executive 
branch, such as leftist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador, this might generate 
pressure to change the fiscal and contractual framework. A key point is whether 
these changes are retroactive by nature and affect contracts already in force or 
whether they are only applied to new contracts. Over the long term, a reputation is 
earned through the handling of situations that arise and not only based on what is 
written on paper.  
 
The Case of Mexico 
 
The case of Mexico is the focus of the other chapters of this volume, and therefore at this 
point, we will only briefly comment on how it fits within the conceptual framework 
described in the foregoing sections. Since the 1980s, with the discovery of important 
deposits in shallow waters, Mexico has been an important net exporter and, until very 
recently, the main producer in the region.  
 
Even though oil has ceased to account for a significant share of exports, it continues to be 
significant for the nation’s fiscal revenues. At its peak, the revenue from petroleum 
accounted for approximately one-third of the total state income. Fiscal dependency on 
petroleum is higher only in Venezuela and Ecuador, which is surprising, considering that 
Mexico is the most diversified economy of the region. This fiscal dependency has caused 
the petroleum industry to be viewed by the authorities basically as a source of revenue and 
not as an activity that generates economic growth.  
 
The case of Mexico has been emblematic of using a state company as a fiscal, financial, and 
political tool, which has also occurred in other important net exporters. The excessive 
collection of rents kept the state company under pressure to obtain higher current 
revenues at the cost of replacing its oil reserves and, therefore, at the expense of its future 
production. The lack of PEMEX’s financial autonomy was reflected by the fact that the 
company carried excessive debt in order to comply with its fiscal commitments and posted 
losses after taxes on a regular basis in spite of its tremendous cash flow, which it was not 
allowed to sufficiently invest in order to restore its reserves.  
 
“Milking the cash cow” was possible without a drop in production thanks to the immense 
productivity of shallow water fields, particularly the Cantarell field, which was exploited 
intensively and reached levels of production surpassing two million barrels per day (close 
to two-thirds of the total domestic production). However, when production of this field 
began to collapse in the middle of the last decade, the PEMEX’s fall in production became 
unstoppable. The company substantially increased its investment, more than doubling it, 
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which allowed it raise the production of other fields by more than 700 thousand barrels; 
even in this manner, however, it was not able to avoid a substantial decline in total 
production and proven reserves. To provide an idea of the magnitude of the investment 
that PEMEX has to make, it is worthwhile to emphasize that, in 2013-2014, PEMEX 
invested more than all other Mexican companies listed on the stock exchange combined. 
 
This set of circumstances—namely, the drop in production and reserves—combined with a 
substantial increase in investment created extremely powerful incentives to open the 
industry to private capital and technology even at high oil prices such as the ones that 
prevailed over the period 2004-2014, except for a brief drop during the financial crisis of 
2008-2009. Geology was a determining factor for the change of incentives, considering 
that the most productive areas with the lowest risk in shallow waters were starting to 
become depleted and the portfolio of future projects for the expansion of production and 
reserves requires the assumption of significant risks and very high investments, as well as 
the incorporation of technologies with which PEMEX is not familiar.  
 
An initial attempt to open up the industry occurred during the previous presidency of 
Felipe Calderón of the National Action Party (PAN), although the opposition in Congress 
led by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the Party of the Democratic 
Revolution (PRD), only agreed to a very timid reform that only generated modest progress 
on the basis of limited service agreements. Finally, with the new administration of 
President Enrique Peña Nieto of the PRI, it was possible to go ahead with a very ambitious 
reform with the support of the PAN.  
 
The reform provides for the possibility of upstream foreign investment and allows the use 
of licenses, production-sharing contracts, profit-sharing agreements, and risk or pure 
service contracts, with or without state equity participation. With the authorization of the 
Minister of Energy, PEMEX can enter into associations for the development of areas 
assigned to it. The reform also represents a significant change in the governance of the 
state-owned company: PEMEX maintains its ownership by the state, although it is provided 
with increased autonomy and reinforced accountability. The reform establishes or 
reinforces regulatory agencies for block assignments, safety and environmental protection, 
and the fiscal monitoring of contracts. Likewise, the reform creates a fiscal stabilization 
fund and establishes principles of transparency.  
 
Some points of the reform that are noteworthy from the perspective of this article are the 
following:  
1. The fact that a constitutional reform was approved that required super-
majorities separates the case of Mexico from others in the region. Although the 
Brazilian reform also required changing the constitution, the Mexican reform is 
more comprehensive and detailed and provides a solid footing for long-term oil 
policy. Only the maintenance of PEMEX as a 100 percent state-owned company 
makes the Mexican reform less significant in this particular respect compared 
with those carried out in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. Party fragmentation in the 
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Mexican political system and the division of powers that this tends to imply 
make it a constitutional reform that will not be easy to overturn in the future. 
2. The fact that Mexican leftist parties and a good part of public opinion have 
actively opposed the reform or viewed it with suspicion creates a potential 
problem of credibility in the future. A scenario in which a popular majority can 
be built that favors overturning the reforms is perfectly conceivable, and it 
remains to be seen whether the political institutional system will turn this into a 
reversal of the fiscal and contractual framework. The pronounced petroleum 
nationalism that has characterized public opinion in Mexico and the strong 
suspicion that powerful interests may benefit at the expense of the nation creates 
a breeding ground for a discourse of demands in the event that the appropriate 
circumstances arise.   
3. The structure of the institutional framework of the petroleum reform in general 
has some traits that make it a good basis for creating regulatory and contractual 
credibility. The politically independent regulatory agency, the new autonomy of 
PEMEX, and the weights and counterweights between different state entities 
create a grid of veto points that makes an opportunistic individual action by a 
single player difficult. Certainly, the excessive number of players involved may 
hinder effectiveness and implementation, although it offers greater guarantees 
to prevent a process equivalent to those that took place in Argentina, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and Venezuela. Additionally, Mexico has an advantage over these 
countries insofar as the general perception of the stability of the rule of law for 
investors is concerned, which, although not very high compared with its 
partners in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), is above the regional average and very much above that of Venezuela.30 
Likewise, both the international integration of the Mexican economy, which is 
highly diversified and depends significantly on foreign investment, and 
Mexico’s participation in multiple free-trade and investment agreements offer 
significant additional guarantees. 
4. The fiscal and contractual framework of the petroleum reform is progressive. 
The royalty rate, meaning the percentage of gross income obtained by the state, 
increases with the oil price, and the regressive character of this instrument is 
thereby significantly avoided. Likewise, under production-sharing agreements, 
the state’s share of profits increases as the profitability of the project grows. 
Furthermore, the contractual government-take has been the fundamental 
parameter of the transparent auctions to assign the blocks, which lends 
legitimacy to the distribution of the revenue obtained. The Ministry of Finance 
establishes the minimum for each block auctioned, setting a floor for state 
participation.  
5. Despite proper design of the fiscal and contractual framework, two issues that 
may create a lot of controversy in the future are still pending: a) state 
participation will be relatively low initially, which is logical because investors 
have not yet recovered their investment, but in the event that the price rises 
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quickly or in the case of a large discovery of reserves, it is possible that the 
progressive elements of the contract are not sufficient to calm short-term 
revenue pressures; and b) the state’s share of profits under contracts with private 
operators will in general be substantially less than the average obtained under 
PEMEX projects. Again, this is reasonable since the bidding rounds cover 
projects with greater risk whose profitability will, in most cases, be less than the 
average of the PEMEX portfolio. Furthermore, many PEMEX projects have 
already been amortized and are low-risk projects because they are at the 
extraction stage. However, this may appear suspicious and insufficient during 
some years when payments per barrel are reported by the private sector that are 
much lower compared with those of PEMEX, particularly during the initial stage 
of the projects. These two issues suggest the crucial importance of transparency 
regarding the issue of revenue collection, although also there is the need to 
inform political players and the public about the complexity of this issue and the 
fact that higher risk can only be compensated through a higher return for the 
investors. This may be particularly difficult to accept in the event of a major 
discovery, equivalent to the Brazilian Pre-salt or Cantarell. How can high profits 
for a transnational company be justified when the lottery risks have already 
dematerialized and people only see the large prize after the fact? It will be very 
easy to create the impression that the nation’s natural wealth was given away 
with few benefits for the nation. 
6. Items 2 and 5 are connected with one last issue: the importance of making the 
reasons for and the process of annulling or cancelling contracts very clear, as 
well as the legal remedies that are available to investors. Although the state must 
be able to act in a sovereign manner in case of non-compliance by operators, it is 
crucial that solid guarantees be offered so that this process will not be used for 
opportunistic purposes for renegotiation or for retaining high-profitability 
projects as soon as the risks decrease. The threat of cancellation may represent a 
very powerful weapon for the executive branch or PEMEX to force the 
renegotiation of its share of profits. This is not a theoretical argument, but rather 
one that reflects experience in many other countries during periods of 
regulatory “expropriation.” Considering that investors cannot easily quantify 
this risk, this may have a negative impact on the bids they submit in the auctions 
or may even cause them to refrain from participating as long as the risk is 
judged to be significant. For the state, it could be an important gain to credibly 
assume the obligation of refraining from canceling contracts in an opportunistic 
manner. How to do this without sacrificing sovereignty and the regulatory 
flexibility to adjust to changes in the environment, and at the same time 
maintain an efficient mechanism to monitor and sanction contractual non-
compliance by operators, is one of the challenges faced by the implementation 
of the reform.31  
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Mexico’s petroleum reform has been much more significant than predicted by the 
majority of analysts. In general, it seems to offer a very solid institutional framework for 
the petroleum sector. Mexico was able to use the fact that it was the last country to open 
this sector to learn from prior experiences in the region and throughout the world. This 
should offer important guarantees for investors that, combined with the large geological 
potential of Mexico, might create significant attractiveness. Furthermore, its proximity to 
the United States offers great advantages because it has the most developed petroleum 
services industry in the world and geology with important similarities to that of Mexico.  
 
However, in addition to being a part of North America, Mexico is also a part of Latin 
America, a region with a reputation of great instability insofar as industry regulation is 
concerned. Therefore, it should be expected that significant changes in the political 
environment, the price of oil, or the geologic lottery may create incentives to overturn the 
reform. Therefore, the perception of risk will depend on the handling and institutional 
construction of the reform and not only on its initial architecture.   
 
The lowering of prices that began in 2014 creates major difficulties for the success of the 
reform, since it will be harder to attract investment in areas with low geological 
attractiveness. The government is forced to reevaluate its expectations in terms of tax 
shares, although at the same time, it must take care to avoid the perception that it is “giving 
away” the national wealth and obtaining little in return; therefore, it will be difficult to 
leave it up to the market to decide on the value of blocks during auctions, and the 
government will want to maintain minimum government-take levels. On the other hand, 
the lower prices for crude oil make the reform even more relevant, because the prior 
model was even more unviable, considering the pressure on PEMEX’s cash flow. Finally, 
with low prices, decreasing investors’ perception of “surface” risks, which cause them to 
demand a higher return or discourage them from participating, becomes even more 
important.    
 
Of course, there are contingencies impossible to predict that will certainly surprise us, but 
at least it is paramount to attempt avoiding those contingencies that are actually easy to 
predict, such as price changes or significant discoveries, that would throw the reforms and 
the development of the immense geological potential of Mexico off track. Finally, it will 
always be necessary to periodically adjust the legal and institutional framework of the 
sector; the key is to carry out such adjustments in a manner that does not destroy its 
credibility and guarantees predictability on how unavoidable disputes between the state 
and investors will be resolved, thereby ensuring that the best interests of the nation are not 
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 1993 2003 2013 
Argentina 2.2 2.7 2.4 
Brazil 5.0 10.6 15.6 
Colombia 3.2 1.5 2.4 
Ecuador 3.7 5.1 8.2 
Mexico 50.8 16 11.1 
Peru 0.8 0.9 1.4 
Venezuela 64.4 77.2 298.3 
Total 128.7 114.8 338.4 
 








1 Three countries—Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina—declined substantially, and two—
Brazil and Colombia—partially compensated. In general, it can be concluded that except 
for these two countries, the region wasted the opportunity of the price boom. 
2 The extraction rate is the ratio between production and reserves. The region has 20 
percent of the worldwide oil reserves, but only 11 percent of production. 
3 One important element to consider is the preponderance of state-owned companies in 
countries with a relevant oil production. No other industry of tradable goods is dominated 
in such a manner by the public sector. Most of the petroleum reserves of the region and in 
the world are in the hands of state-owned companies (or mixed companies) such as 
PEMEX, PDVSA, Petrobras, YPF, Ecopetrol, and Petroecuador. Due to their nature, in spite 
of being less efficient, state-owned companies tend to be subject to higher tax rates, in 
many cases at the cost of long-term investment. Typically, state-owned companies operate 
in mature areas of production with greater rents and fewer risks. States generally invite the 
private sector to invest in areas with a greater geological risk, greater technological 
complexity, and lower rents, and reserve the best areas for the state-owned company. 
State-owned companies may be just as susceptible as, or even more susceptible than, 
private companies to “expropriation” cycles, in this case through increases in the extraction 
of revenues by the state, making it impossible to carry out the investments that are 
necessary to maintain or increase future production.  
4 Rents may be the result of the presence of naturally low extraction costs of high-quality 
mineral deposits (with higher prices) regarding a marginal producer. Rents may also be the 
result of natural relative scarcity, restrictions in terms of access to reserves, or production 
restrictions, which are typically within the scope of cartels’ actions. 
5 Seismic studies, the exploration and development of fields, and the construction of oil 
pipelines or gas pipelines are examples of immobilized assets. 
6  One extreme example of sunken costs is the Kashagan project in Kazakhstan. A 
consortium of international companies invested more than USD 50 billion and has not yet 
started production more than 15 years after the start of the project. It is estimated that 
operating costs will be around USD 8 per barrel. As long as, let’s say, a price of more than 
USD 15 per barrel is obtained, the consortium would have incentives to continue operating 
even without recovering sunken costs.     
7 The fact that in the case of the hydrocarbons sector, products are consumed widely by the 
population and represent a significant portion of its basket of consumption causes 
consumers to pressure governments to establish cross-subsidies or other regulations that 
favor specific interest groups and also makes the domestic price a highly politicized issue. 
8 Expropriation of the profits of state-owned companies may also generate political 
benefits over the short term with long-term effects on production and investment, 
depending on their corporate governance and political-institutional framework, among 
other variables. As a matter of fact, state companies have in some cases been the greatest 	




victims of over-extraction of revenue by states. Over the past decades, PEMEX and PDVSA 
have been obvious examples thereof. The “expropriation” of revenues from state-owned 
companies is the rule rather than the exception in the region. Petrobras is an interesting 
case study of a state company that has managed to maintain its capacity of investment and 
that has expanded beyond its borders, although it has recently also fallen victim to 
politicization and corruption, as well as being used for goals other than petroleum-related 
activity. 
9 As a matter of fact, external mechanisms to ensure compliance with commitments have 
played a much more important role than national institutions throughout the history of 
investment in oil and minerals in developing countries.  
10 This phenomenon was initially identified by Raymond Vernon, who called it “the 
obsolescing bargain.” 
11 There are exceptions, such as Petrobras (Brazil) and Statoil (Norway), which have excelled 
in terms of their capacity for offshore extraction and in different regions of the world. 
12  It is important to emphasize that the level of proven reserves is not completely 
exogenous; i.e., it is not only based on the natural abundance of the resource in the subsoil, 
but rather also significantly depends on investment in exploration, technological changes, 
and the oil price level on the international market. As a result, up to certain point, the 
existence of reserves is endogenous to the institutional framework and the policies that 
have prevailed in the past. At the same time, reserves are a primordial determinant of the 
institutions and policies that are developed by countries. 
13 Even though, of course, they are also interested in collecting revenues, this is not their 
first priority; they are interested in developing those marginal deposits where, at prevailing 
prices, there are no rents, although they are economically viable with a reduced tax burden. 
From the point of view of net-importing governments, revenues are not generated on the 
international market but rather are extracted from their citizens. Therefore, they are 
concerned about the impact of increases in international prices on domestic consumers. It 
is for this reason, and due to the need to avoid high demand for foreign currencies for the 
import of hydrocarbons, that the interests of these governments are aimed at investment 
and long-term production. 
14 State-owned oil companies will tend to prevail in mature petroleum provinces where the 
risks have been identified and technology is accessible through service companies. In new 
developments at the geologic and/or technological frontier, even governments of net-
exporting countries will be more inclined to accept the presence of multinational 
companies (Nolan and Thurber 2010). 
15 Exploitation licenses are similar to concessions, except that ownership of the resource 
remains in the hands of the state. 
16 Bonuses are payments that the operator makes to the state when signing the contract or 
achieving certain project milestones. 	




17 The criteria that are generally used are the following: 1) Neutrality: it must permit the 
development of projects with different characteristics and levels of profitability. 2) 
Progressivity: it must be capable of capturing rents under different scenarios of prices, 
costs, and production. 3) Stability: it is desirable that it would be as stable and predictable as 
possible to reduce uncertainty and its negative effects on investment. 4) Incentives to limit 
costs: it must provide incentives for the operator to controls its costs. 5) Volatility of tax 
revenues: considering the significant volatility in terms of petroleum prices and its harmful 
effect on macroeconomic stability, states prefer that the fiscal mechanism guarantee a 
certain level and stability of tax revenue. 6) Competitiveness: whenever countries compete 
to attract investments in the hydrocarbons sector, it is necessary that they are competitive 
internationally. This means that profitability adjusted for the project risk after taxes must 
be comparable with that of its competitors. 7) Simplicity and transparency: it is desirable 
that the same be easy to administer (without excessive monitoring costs) and that this 
administration be transparent (Monaldi 2012; Tissot 2010). 
18 It is assumed that, due to the nature of the asymmetries of information in this sector—
particularly in the case of transnational companies—and considering that the collecting 
bureaucracies do not have the level of knowledge of its peers as companies, the most 
sophisticated fiscal systems, which are more efficient from the economic point of view and 
which more effectively capture rents, may allow companies to evade taxes. 
19 This pattern of expropriation has also been found in Russia, Kazakhstan, Libya, Yemen, 
and other developing countries (Monaldi 2010). 
20 Venezuela has been the first- or second-largest producer of oil and the largest exporter 
in the region and has by far the largest reserves of hydrocarbons. Venezuela is the only 
Latin-American country that is a founding member of the Organization of Oil Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). Oil is the main source of tax revenue and represents more than 50 
percent of tax revenue and more than 90 percent of exports. Since 1928, oil has been the 
main source of exports. 
21 In 2013, Chevron obtained a new contract with important guaranties for the investor in 
exchange for a loan to its mixed company with PDVSA. Other companies such as CNPC 
and Repsol have done the same. It is worthwhile to note that a significant offshore gas 
project in association with Repsol and ENI was finished. Thus, with proper conditions, it is 
still possible to attract investment. 
22 Ecuador is the fourth-largest exporter and has the fourth-largest reserves in the region. 
Oil generated more than one-third of the tax revenue of the country and represented 
around half the amount of exports. 
23 Bolivia does not have any significant oil reserves, but does have natural gas reserves. 
Over the past decade, Bolivia has become the largest exporter of natural gas and has been 
ranked second in terms of proven gas reserves in the region and first insofar as free gas 
reserves are concerned. 	




24 Over the entire life of the project, the fiscal system was progressive, although over the 
short term, the state captured a smaller part of revenues. 
25 The origin of gas revenues changed in 1999, which had significant consequences for the 
political economy of the sector. Before Bolivia started to export natural gas to Brazil, a 
majority of the fiscal gas revenue came from the Bolivian domestic market. As a result, 
there were local political pressures to not increase the price of the product. Since 1999, 
most of the state’s profits come from gas exports to Brazil. This change caused the political 
economy of the sector to implement the same incentives that exist within a typical net 
exporter in lieu of those appropriate for a net importer.    
26 It must be pointed out that in the case of Bolivia, nationalistic pressure emerged through 
opposition to the government of the President Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada and was a 
significant factor for his overthrow and the eventual rise to power of Evo Morales. 
27 The technological advances in the United States in terms of the production of shale gas 
make the exploitation of Vaca Muerta possible. 
28 It is worthwhile to point out that shale production is characterized by sunken costs that 
are much lower than those of traditional petroleum exploitation and by the need for 
permanent investment; this makes it less susceptible to expropriation. 
29In large part due to the private company Pacific, led by Venezuelan expatriates that had 
been laid off by PDVSA during the Chávez government. 
30 For example, according to the governance indicators of the World Bank and the World 
Economic Forum. 
31 It should be noted that in view of the scarce interest from investors during the first 
auction of the first round, important changes were made to clarify the conditions and 
procedures for the cancellation of contracts as well as the use of arbitration clauses. 
